Fairness, Efficiency, and the Nash Bargaining Solution by Rachmilevitch, Shiran





A bargaining solution balances fairness and eciency if each player's
payo lies between the minimum and maximum of the payos assigned
to him by the egalitarian and utilitarian solutions. In the 2-person
bargaining problem, the Nash solution is the unique scale-invariant so-
lution satisfying this property. Additionally, a similar result, relating
the weighted egalitarian and utilitarian solutions to a weighted Nash
solution, is obtained. These results are related to a theorem of Shap-
ley, which I generalize. For n  3, there does not exist any n-person
scale-invariant bargaining solution that balances fairness and eciency.
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11 Introduction
Consider a set of players (bargainers) who are facing a bargaining problem.
Fairness and eciency are natural objectives that they (or an arbitrator) may
have in mind, but taking both of them into account simultaneously is non-
trivial, because promoting the one typically involves compromising on the
other. Moreover, this task involves an additional diculty: both fairness and
eciency rely on the idea of interpersonal utility comparisons. The former
involves considerations in the spirit of \if you gain this much I should gain
at least this much," the latter involves considerations in the spirit of \do me
a favor, it would only cost you a little, but would help me a lot." How do
we know that the utility functions in terms of which the bargaining problem
is dened capture those interpersonal comparisons appropriately? One may
argue that we need to have the \right" utilities before any further analysis of
fairness and eciency is to be carried out.
Let us say that a 2-person bargaining problem is harmonic if its egalitarian
and utilitarian solutions agree. Given a bargaining problem, we can rescale its
utilities such that the resulting problem is harmonic. Dening these new utili-
ties to be the \right" ones resolves both of the issues described in the previous
paragraph. First, we obtain a utility scale to work with; second, the tension
between fairness and eciency is trivially resolved, because the bargaining
problem which is dened by this utility scale is harmonic. Shapley (1969)
showed that the egalitarian/utilitarian solution of the rescaled problem, when
scaled back, is the Nash solution of the original problem. Therefore, Shap-
ley's Theorem can be thought of as describing a sense in which fairness and
2eciency are reconciled, and showing that only the Nash solution satises it.1
This sense implicitly assumes that the bargaining solution is invariant to in-
dependent (linear) rescalings of the players' utilities.
I provide a simpler sense in which the Nash solution reconciles fairness and
eciency. Simpler|since it does not refer to the utility scales. I demand that
the solution lies \between" the egalitarian and utilitarian solutions; namely,
that for every bargaining problem and every player the following is true: the
player's solution payo lies between the minimum and the maximum of the
payos assigned to him by the egalitarian and utilitarian solutions.2 I call
this balancing fairness and eciency. I prove that the Nash solution balances
fairness and eciency. It follows from Shapley's Theorem that it is the unique
scale-invariant solution with this property.
The utilitarian and egalitarian solutions have straightforward generaliza-
tions to nonsymmetric bargaining: that of the former is obtained by maximiz-
ing a weighted sum of utilities, and that of the latter|by assigning payos
according to xed (not necessarily identical) proportions. These solutions can
be thought of in terms of a two-step procedure: rst, utilities are rescaled|
player 1's payo is scaled by p 2 (0;1) and player 2's payo is scaled by 1 p;
next, either egalitarianism or utilitarianism is applied. Given the weights
(p;1 p), a bargaining solution balances fairness and eciency with respect to
1Harsanyi (1959) has a lemma that states that the Nash solution is the only utility
allocation that coincides simultaneously with both the egalitarian and utilitarian solutions
for some rescaling of the utilities; it follows from the scale-invariance of the Nash solution
that the egalitarian/utilitarian solution of the scaled problem, when scaled back, is the Nash
solution of the original problem. Shapley (1969) was the rst to state the result in this way.
2More precisely, the requirement is that there is a selection from the utilitarian solution
(which, in general, is multi valued), such that the above condition is satised. See Section
3 below for the precise denition.
3p if each player's solution payo lies between the minimum and the maximum
of the payos assigned to him by the corresponding weighted egalitarian and
utilitarian solutions. I show that there exists a function h: (0;1) ! (0;1) that
satises h(1
2) = 1
2, such that the following is true: given p 2 (0;1), the weighted
Nash solution with weights (h(p);1 h(p)) is the unique scale-invariant solution
that balances fairness and eciency with respect to p. Based on this result,
I obtain the following generalization of Shapley's Theorem: any problem can
be rescaled such that the p-weighted egalitarian and utilitarian solutions of
the resulting problem agree, and scaling the agreed-upon point back results
in the h(p)-weighted Nash solution of the original problem. It is worth noting
that the function h satises (p   1
2)(h(p)   p) > 0 for all p 6= 1
2, which means
that in order to balance fairness and eciency with respect to p, the strong
player|the one whose payo gets more weight|needs to be favored, in the
sense of being assigned to an augmented weight in the Nash product.
The relationship between egalitarianism and utilitarianism has for quite
some time been the subject of a vibrant discourse, especially since the publi-
cation of Rawls' A Theory of Justice, back in 1971 (see Arrow (1973), Harsanyi
(1975), Lyons (1972), Sen (1974), and Yaari (1981), among others). A par-
ticularly heated debate sprouted up between Rawls and Harsanyi (see Rawls
(1974), which was replayed to by Harsanyi (1975)), the former advocating the
maxmin rule as the \right" principle for governing society's decisions, the lat-
ter advocating the sum-of-utilities criterion. Within the connes of 2-person
bargaining theory, my paper proposes a compromise between these competing
positions;3 moreover, subject to scale-invariance, this compromise|the Nash
3Of course, the theory of distributive justice concerns itself also with issues outside
the bargaining model, such as freedom, needs, and more (see Roemer (1986)). I do not
claim that the current paper proposes a general reconciliation between egalitarianism and
4solution|is unique. To put it in a catchy phrase: only Nash can bridge the
gap between Harsanyi and Rawls.
Whether this compromise is a decent compromise will be discussed at the
end of the paper. As already seen above, the answer to this question is far
from obvious, since without symmetry balancing fairness and eciency implies
a bias in favor of the strong and against the weak, which, to say the least, is
not the rst thing that comes to mind when thinking about distributive justice.
The aforementioned results do not extend to multi-person bargaining: given
any n  3, there does not exist a scale-invariant n-person bargaining solution
that lies \between" the egalitarian and utilitarian solutions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the for-
mal model. Section 3 presents the main concept of interest|balancing fairness
and eciency. It also introduces a related concept|guarantee of minimal fair-
ness|and discusses the relation between the two. Section 4 considers symmet-
ric 2-person bargaining, Section 5 introduces asymmetry, Section 6 considers
multiperson bargaining, Section 7 concludes, and the Appendix collects proofs
which are omitted from the text.
2 Model
An n-person bargaining problem is a pair (S;d) such that S  Rn is closed
and convex, and d 2 S is such that Sd  fx 2 Sjx > dg is nonempty and
bounded.4 The points of S, the feasible set, are the (v.N-M) utility vectors
that the players can achieve via cooperation (if they agree on (x1; ;xn) 2 S,
utilitarianism|it does so only in the context of a particular model. It is, however, an
important model.
4Vector inequalities in Rn: xRy if and only if xiRyi for all i, for both R 2 f>;g.
5player i receives the utility payo xi), and d species their utilities in case they
do not agree unanimously on some point of S; it is called the disagreement
point. Let Bn denote the collection of all such pairs.
A solution on Bn is any function : Bn ! Rn that satises (S;d) 2 S
for all (S;d) 2 Bn. The Nash solution (due to Nash (1950)), N, is the unique
maximizer of n
i=1(xi   di) over x 2 Sd. The egalitarian solution (due to
Kalai (1977)), E, is given by E(S;d) = d +   1,5 where  is the maxi-
mal number such that the right hand side is in S. Given a problem (S;d),
let U(S;d)  argmaxx2Sd
P
xi. A bargaining solution, , is utilitarian, if
(S;d) 2 U(S;d) for every problem (S;d). A generic utilitarian solution is
denoted by U. I will sometimes abuse terminology a little, and refer to U as
the utilitarian solution.
A solution, , is weakly Pareto optimal if (S;d) 2 WP(S)  fx 2 Sjy >
x ) y = 2 Sg for every (S;d) 2 Bn; it is strongly Pareto optimal if the analogous
condition holds when WP(S) is replaced by P(S)  fx 2 Sjy 6= x&y  x )
y = 2 Sg; it is scale-invariant if   (S;d) = (  S;  d) for every positive
linear transformation : Rn ! Rn and every (S;d) 2 Bn;6 I will sometime call
a positive linear transformation a rescaling.
Let B+
n  Bn consist of those (S;d) 2 Bn such that (i) S  Rn
+ and (ii)
d = 0. In the sequel, the domain of analysis will be B+
n. With the dis-
agreement point normalized to the origin, I will abuse notation a little and




n = fS 2 B+
njU(S) is a singletong. Let B
2 be
the collection of those problems in B
+
2 which are smooth: those S 2 B
+
2 for
51 = (1; ;1). Similarly, 0 = (0; ;0).
6A function : Rn ! Rn is a positive linear transformation if   (x1; ;xn) 
(1x1; ;nxn) for some numbers i > 0
6which WP(S) = P(S) = f(a;f(a))ja 2 [0;A]g, where A > 0 is some number
and f : [0;A] ! R+ is a twice dierentiable strictly concave function. The
family B
2 is dense in B
+
2 : for every S 2 B
+
2 there exists a sequence fSng  B
2,
such that Sn converges to S in the Hausdor metric. Moreover, B
2  BU
2 , and
if fSng  B
2 is a sequence that converges to S in the Huasdor metric, then
limnU(Sn) 2 U(S), independent of whether S 2 BU
2 .
A solution, , is continuous, if for every sequence of problems in its domain
fSng and every problem in its domain S, (Sn) converges to (S) if Sn con-
verges to S in the Hausdor metric. The solutions N and E are continuous
on B+
n, and U is continuous on the restricted domain BU
n.
3 Balancing fairness and eciency
The main concept of interest in this paper is this:
Denition 1. A solution on B+
n, , balances fairness and eciency if
for every S 2 B+
n there exists a U(S) 2 U(S) such that the following is true
for every i:
minfEi(S);Ui(S)g  i(S)  maxfEi(S);Ui(S)g:
Denition 1 intends to express a form of compromise between fairness and
eciency. Implicitly, it identies \betweenness," in the simple sense of ordering
numbers on the real line, as the appropriate notion for such a compromise. It
is logically stronger than the following:
Denition 2. A solution on B+
n, , guarantees minimal fairness if for
every S 2 B+
n there exists a U(S) 2 U(S) such that the following is true for
every i:
i(S)  minfEi(S);Ui(S)g:
7Underlying this denition is not a notion of compromise (or betweenness), but
a one of insurance: a solution that adheres to it guarantees that payos will
never fall short of a certain bound, this bound incorporating both fairness and
eciency. In the special case of two players, the two denitions are equivalent;
with more than two players, the former is strictly stronger.
Proposition 1. Let n = 2. Then, a solution balances fairness and eciency
if and only if it guarantees minimal fairness.
Proposition 2. Let n  3. Then, there exists a solution that guarantees
minimal fairness, but that does not balance fairness and eciency.
4 Symmetric 2-person bargaining
As the following proposition shows, the 2-person Nash solution adheres to
Denition 1.
Proposition 3. The Nash solution balances fairness and eciency on B
+
2 .
Proof. We need to prove that  = N satises the requirement of Denition
1. By the continuity properties of the bargaining solutions, it is enough to
establish this fact on the restricted domain B
2.
Assume by contradiction that there exists a problem S 2 B
2 for which this
is not true. Let f be the smooth function describing P(S) = WP(S). Since
U(S) 2 P(S), we can assume, wlog, that U1(S)  E1(S). If N(S) is not
between E(S) and U(S), then either N1(S) > U1(S) or N1(S) < E1(S).
Suppose rst that N1(S) > U1(S). Note that N(S) is the solution to
the maximization of af(a) and U(S) is the solution to the maximization of
a + f(a), both over a 2 [0;A]. The rst order condition for N is f(N1(S)) +
8N1(S)f0(N1(S)) = 0 ) f0(N1(S)) =  
f(N1(S))
N1(S) . The derivative of the objec-
tive that U maximizes is 1 + f0(a), and at the optimum (i.e., at a = U1(S))
it is nonpositive, because, by assumption, U1(S) < N1(S) < A. Therefore,
f0(U1(S))   1. Since f is concave, N1(S) > U1(S) implies f0(N1(S)) 
f0(U1(S)). Therefore  
f(N1(S))
N1(S)   1, or f(N1(S))  N1(S). Therefore,
N(S) = (N1(S);f(N1(S)))  (N1(S);N1(S)) > (U1(S);U1(S)), in contra-
diction to U(S) 2 P(S).
Suppose, on the other hand, that N1(S) < E1(S)  e. This implies that
N(S) = (e   x;e + y) for some x;y > 0, because N(S) 2 P(S). Next, I argue
that x  y. To see this, assume by contradiction that x < y, so N1(S) +
N2(S) > E1(S) + E2(S). Also, recall that U1(S)  E1(S) = e. If U1(S) > e
then there exists an  2 (0;1) such that U(S)+(1 )N(S) > (e;e) = E(S).
Therefore U1(S) = e, so U(S) = (e;e), because E(S) 2 WP(S) = P(S). By
denition of U, 2e  2e   x + y. Therefore x  y, in contradiction to the
initial assumption x < y. Thus, it must be that x  y. Finally, note that
by denition of N, (e   x)(e + y) > e2, hence ey > ex + xy. Combining this
inequality with x  y gives ex  ex + xy, a contradiction.
Next, one would like to know whether there are other solutions on B
+
2 that
balance fairness and eciency. The trivial answer to this question is that
there are innitely many such solutions, as any selection between E and U will
do. This question becomes more interesting if one introduces the additional
restriction of scale-invariance. Under this restriction, it turns out, only N
balances fairness and eciency. To prove this uniqueness, the following result,
which is due to Shapley (henceforth, Shapley's Theorem), is useful.
Theorem 1. (Shapley (1969)) Let S 2 B
+
2 and x 2 S. Then x = N(S) if and
9only if the following statement is true:
 There exists a rescaling of S, T = S, such that x = E(T) 2 U(T).
In particular, it follows that one can always rescale a given problem as to
obtain a harmonic one|a one whose egalitarian and utilitarian solutions agree
(because N(S) exists for every S).




Proof. Let  be a solution that balances fairness and eciency and let S 2 B
+
2 .
By Shapley's Theorem, there exists a rescaling of S such that the rescaled
problem, call it T, satises E(T) = (x;x) 2 U(T). Suppose rst that U(T)
is a singleton; then its unique element is U(T) = (x;x). In this case i(T) 
minfEi(T);Ui(T)g = x, and it follows from the strong Pareto optimality of U
that (T) = (x;x). By Proposition 3, N(T) = (x;x). Since both  and N are
scale-invariant solutions, (S) = N(S).
Consider now the case where U(T) is not a singleton. Let U(T) be the
selection from U(T) such that the requirement of Denition 1 holds. If U(T) =
(x;x), then the proof is completed by the same argument as above. Suppose,
on the other hand that U(T) 6= (x;x). By Shapley's Theorem (x;x) = E(T) 2
P(T), and therefore Ui(T) < x and Uj(T) > x for some (i;j). Wlog, suppose
that (i;j) = (1;2). That is, the utilitarian selection U is to the left of (x;x)
and the segment connecting the two has a slope  1. Moreover, the solution
point (T) belongs to this segment. I argue that it must be that (T) = (x;x).
To see this, assume by contradiction that it is to the left of (x;x). Now, rescale
player 1's utility by some  > 1 close to 1. By scale-invariance the solution
point changes only slightly, but the utilitarian solution of the scaled problem
10jumps to the right of the 45 line|a contradiction. Finally, the latter argument
also applies to the Nash solution, and therefore N(T) = (T) = (x;x).
5 2-person bargaining without symmetry
Given the weights (p;1   p) > 0, the corresponding weighted solutions to
the problem S 2 B
+
2 are dened as follows: a weighted utilitarian solution
maximizes the sum px1 + (1   p)x2 over x 2 S, the weighted egalitarian
solution is given by (p;(1 p)), where  is the maximal number such that the





2 over x 2 S. I will denote the weighted egalitarian and Nash
solutions by Ep and Np, respectively. Let Up(S)  argmaxx2Spx1 + (1   p)x2
and let  
p
1 p. Note that given S 2 B
+
2 , Ep(S) takes the form (y;y), Np
maximizes the product x
1x2 over x 2 S, and every solution that picks points
in Up(S) maximizes x1 + x2 over x 2 S.
The following is an adaptation of Denition 1 to the symmetry-free 2-
person setting.
Denition 3. Let p 2 (0;1). A solution on B
+
2 , , balances fairness
and eciency with respect to p if for every S 2 B
+
2 there exists an













2p2   2p + 1
:
Theorem 2. Let p 2 (0;1) and let  be a scale-invariant solution. Then 
balances fairness and eciency with respect to p if and only if  = Nh(p).
11Since h(1
2) = 1
2, Theorem 2 implies both Proposition 3 and Corollary 1; its
proof (which appears in the Appendix) is based on the following lemma:
Lemma 1. Let p 2 (0;1) and S 2 B
+
2 . Then there is a rescaling of S,
T =   S, such that Ep(T) 2 Up(T).
Moreover, when this lemma is combined with the other ideas that are utilized
in Theorem 2's proof, the following result obtains:
Theorem 3. (A generalized Shapley Theorem) Let S 2 B
+
2 , x 2 S, and
p 2 (0;1). Then x = Nh(p)(S) if and only if the following statement is true:
 There exists a rescaling of S, T = S, such that x = Ep(T) 2 Up(T).
Proof. Let p 2 (0;1). Fix S and x 2 S. Suppose rst that x = Nh(p)(S).
Let  be the rescaling from Lemma 1. I will prove that   x = Ep(T),
where T =   S. That is, I will prove that Nh(p)(T) = Ep(T). Assume by
contradiction that Nh(p)(T) 6= Ep(T); wlog, since both of these points are
strongly Pareto optimal in T, suppose that Nh(p) is to the left and above
Ep(T). Let  =
h(p)
1 h(p). Note that  = 2, where  =
p
1 p. Let Nh(p) = (x;y).




the tangency condition associated with Nh(p)(T) is 
y
x = , it follows that the
negative of the slope of the hyperbola associated with Nh(p) at the point (x;y)
is greater than . This, however, is incompatible with the fact that Ep(T) is
down and to the right of (x;y), and the slope there is only .
Conversely, suppose that there exists a rescaling  such that T =   S
satises x = Ep(T) 2 Up(T). We need to prove that x = Nh(p)(S). Assume
by contradiction that x 6= Nh(p)(S). Applying the linear transformation 
to both sides gives   x 6= Nh(p)(  S). That is, Ep(T) 6= Nh(p)(T). Wlog,
suppose that Nh(p)(T) is to the left of Ep(T). The arguments from the previous
paragraph complete the proof.
126 Multiperson bargaining
The following result shows that, under the restriction to scale-invariant solu-
tions, one cannot balance fairness and eciency, in the sense of Denition 1,
when there are more than two players. It is straightforward to modify the
proof in order to show that one cannot balance fairness and eciency, in a
sense analogous to that of Denition 3, with respect to any (p1; ;pn) > 0.
Proposition 4. There does not exist a scale-invariant solution on B+
n that
balances fairness and eciency, for any n  3.
Proof. Assume by contradiction that there exists a scale-invariant solution on
B+
n, for some n  3, that balances fairness and eciency. Given a;b > 0, let:












b2 +n 2 for all i. In particular, this
is true for i = 3. Additionally, it is clear that Ui(Sab) ! 0 as a ! 1, for all




b2 +n 2 for all suciently large a's, it follows that
E3(Sab) > U3(Sab) for all suciently large a's. Therefore, since  balances
fairness and eciency, the following must hold for all suciently large a's:
3(Sab)  E3(Sab): (1)




n. Plugging the expressions for 3(Sab) and E3(Sab)









b2 + n   2
:








b2 + n   2
: (2)




Proposition 4 reinforces a well-known pattern: there is a dierence between
2-person and multi-person bargaining, in the sense that there are results which
are true (false) in the former setting, but false (true) in the latter.7
7 Conclusion
In this paper I have introduced the notion of balancing fairness and eciency
in bargaining. This concept is generally stronger than the related guarantee
of minimal fairness, though in the 2-person case they coincide. Restricting
attention to scale-invariant solutions, I have shown that this balancing is im-
possible in multi-person bargaining, and that there is a unique way to achieve
it in 2-person bargaining: by applying Nash's solution. The balancing con-
cept assumes symmetric players, but it is generalized straightforwardly to a
concept that relates \weighted egalitarianism" and \weighted utilitarianism."
7Here is an example of a possibility result for the 2-person case that cannot be generalized
to more players: Perles and Maschler (1981) derived the existence (and uniqueness) of a
2-person bargaining solution which, in addition to satisfying other standard axioms, is super
additive (see their paper for the denition of this axiom); subsequently, Perles (1982) proved
that no such solution exists in the 3-person case. Here is an example for a possibility result
for more than two players that does not hold for two players: in the paper cited earlier in the
Introduction, Shapley proved that there does not exist an ordinal, ecient, and symmetric
2-person bargaining solution, but he constructed a 3-person solution with these properties;
Samet and Safra (2005) generalized the construction to n players.
14Similarly to the symmetric case, it has been shown that a certain weighted
Nash solution is the only scale-invariant solution that adheres to this concept.
In the existing literature, the result which is closest in spirit to the analysis
carried out here is that of Moulin (1983), who characterized the Nash solution
by two axioms only: Nash's IIA and midpoint domination|an axiom that re-
quires each player's solution payo to lie above the average of his disagreement
and ideal payos (the latter being his maximal payo in the individually ratio-
nal part of the feasible set).8 In other words, it says that the solution should
Pareto dominate \randomized dictatorship": by letting each player be a dicta-
tor with equal probability|an event in which he obtains his ideal payo|one
cannot improve on the solution. The fair lottery in the randomized dictator-
ship process is a starting point that guarantees a minimal degree of fairness;
from there on, eciency enters the picture.
So, is the compromise that the Nash solution proposes between fairness
and eciency an acceptable one? One may very well argue that the answer
is negative. As was already noted by Luce and Raia (1958, p.129-130), the
Nash solution tends to favor players with utility functions closer to linearity,
and this, in the words of Menahem Yaari, \can be regarded as a bias in favor
of the rich and against the poor."9 A similar bias has presented itself in the
current paper: when the weight on player 1's utility is p 2 (0;1), the only way
to balance egalitarianism and utilitarianism (in a way consistent with scale-
invariance) is by applying the nonsymmetric Nash solution that puts weight
8Anbarci (1998) improved Moulin's result by weakening midpoint domination; his char-
acterization replaces it by an axiom that expresses the same requirement, but applies only
to triangular feasible sets. de Clippel (2007) also derives a two-axiom characterization of
the Nash solution, one of the axioms being midpoint domination (the other is disagreement
convexity; see his paper for the denition).
9Yaari (1981), p.38.
15h(p) on player 1's utility. Since (p   1
2)(h(p)   p) > 0 for all p 6= 1
2, the strong
player's weight is augmented in the Nash product and the weak player's weight
is discounted.
There is an additional, and even simpler sense, in which the Nash solution
is \more utilitarian than egalitarian". Whenever the Nash solution coincides
with the egalitarian solution it also coincides with the utilitarian solution.
This is a simple geometric feature of the Nash solution: note that the slope
of the parabola x2 = c
x1 is   c
x2
1, hence equals  1 at x2 = x1, and therefore,
whenever the Nash and the egalitarian solutions agree, the agreed-upon point
maximizes the sum of the players' utilities. The \converse" is, of course, not
true, as can be seen, for example, in rectangular feasible sets.
To summarize, in bridging the gap between egalitarianism and utilitarian-
ism, the Nash solution constitutes a biased compromise. This may lead one
to reject it. A person holding such a view may argue that in order to pro-
mote fairness|with or without regard for eciency|scale-invariance should
be excluded: a joint utility scale, with respect to which all bargaining prob-
lems are to be solved, must be specied in advance. On the other hand, a
person who insists on the v.N-M axioms of utility theory will consequently
insist on scale-invariance. In this case, the aforementioned compromise can be
viewed either as an unfortunate \second-best," or, alternatively, as an ethical
conclusion. A person holding this view may argue that favoring the rich is
(in some circumstances, at least) the ethical thing to do. Both views are a
matter of interpretation, and it is left for the reader to decide where she stands.
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168 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: Let  be a 2-person solution that guarantees mini-
mal fairness. I will prove that the requirement of Denition 1 is satised for
any selection U out of U. Let U be such a selection. Assume by contra-
diction that there is an S and an i such that i(S) > maxfUi(S);Ei(S)g.
Wlog, suppose that i = 1. Since U(S) 2 P(S), 2(S) < U2(S). There-
fore, 2(S) = E2(S)  y. Since 1(S) > y, E(S) = (y;y) = 2 P(S). I
argue that (a;b) 2 S implies b  y. To see this, assume by contradiction
that there is an (a;b) 2 S with b > y. Note that (S) = (x;y) for some
x > y. Therefore, we can nd an  2 (0;1) suciently close to one, such that
(S)+(1 )(a;b) > (y;y), in contradiction to E(S) 2 WP(S). Now, since
U(S) 6= (x;y) and since U(S) maximizes the sum of utilities in S, U1(S) < x
implies that U2(S) > y|a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 2: Let n  3. Let S
n = conv hullf0;ieiji = 1; ;ng,





iiei, where fig are convex weights that satisfy ll = mm











iei if S = S
n
E(S) otherwise
I will prove that (i) this solution guarantees minimal fairness, and (ii) that
it does not balance fairness and eciency. For both (i) and (ii), clearly, only
the problem S
n needs to be considered. Requirement (i) is obviously satised
for players i < n, because the utilitarian payo for each of then is zero. Thus,
what needs a proof here is that player n's payo is at least as large as his
17egalitarian payo (because the latter is obviously smaller than his utilitarian
payo, which equals n). Assume by contradiction that this is not the case; i.e.,
that 1 < nn. Since ll = mm for all 1  l;m  n, it follows that 1 > 1, in
contradiction to the fact that (1; ;n) are convex weights.
Next, consider (ii). I will prove that the n   1-th player receives more
than the maximum of his egalitarian and utilitarian payos. That is, that
n 1
n > (n 1)n 1. To see this, assume by contradiction that n 1  1
n. Now,
since ii = (n   1)n 1  n 1











To obtain the contradiction, I will show that F(n) > 1 for all n  3. This






18 > 1, and F is
strictly increasing (it is a product of two strictly increasing functions of n).
Proof of Theorem 2: I start with the \if" part. By the continuity arguments
invoked in Proposition 3, we can restrict attention to B
2. Let S 2 B
2. Let f
be the smooth function describing S's boundary. Let  =
p
1 p and  =
h(p)
1 h(p).







There are two possibilities: either N
h(p)




1 (S) > E
p
1(S).
Start by assuming the former. Letting a denote the payo for player 1, we see
that the tangency condition associated with Nh(p) is 
f(a)
a =  f0(a). Since
Nh(p) is, by assumption, to the left of Up,  f0(a) < ; combining this with
 = 2 we obtain a > f(a), which contradicts N
h(p)





1 (S) > E
p
1(S). Again, denoting by a player 1's payo under Nh(p)
we have a > f(a), and therefore  f0(a) = 
f(a)
a <  1
 = , in contradiction
18to N
h(p)








There are two possibilities: either N
h(p)




1 (S) < E
p
1(S).
Start by assuming the former. Since Nh(p) is to the right of Up,  f0(a) > ,
hence 
f(a)
a = 2 f(a)





1(S). Next, consider N
h(p)
1 (S) < E
p
1(S). This means that a < f(a) and
therefore  f0(a) = 
f(a)
a = 2 f(a)
a > . This means that Nh(p) must lie to the
right of Up, in contradiction to N
h(p)





I now turn to uniqueness. Let  be an arbitrary solution with the aforemen-
tioned properties, and let p 2 (0;1) be the parameter with respect to which 
balances fairness and eciency. Let S 2 B
+
2 . By Lemma 1, S can be rescaled
such that the resulting problem, call it T, satises Ep(T)  (y;y) = Up(T) for
some Up(T) 2 Up(T), where  =
p
1 p. Suppose rst that Up(T) is a singleton,
containing only (y;y). In this case Up(T) = Ep(T) = (T) = Nh(p)(T),10
and by scale-invariance, (S) = Nh(p)(S).
Suppose that Up(T) is not a singleton, and let Up(T) be the selection out
of it that satises the requirement of Denition 3. If Up(T) = (y;y), then
the proof is completed by the same argument as above. Suppose, on the other
hand that Up(T) 6= (y;y). By Lemma 1, (y;y) = Ep(T) 2 P(T), and there-
fore U
p
i (T) < E
p
i (T) and Uj(T) > E
p
j(T) for some (i;j). Wlog, suppose that
(i;j) = (1;2). That is, the selection Up is to the left of Ep(T) and the segment
connecting the two has a slope  . Moreover, the solution point (T) belongs
to this segment. I argue that it must be that (T) = Ep(T). To see this,
assume by contradiction that it is to its left. Now, rescale player 1's utility
by some  > 1 close to 1. By scale-invariance the solution point changes only
10The last equality here is due to the fact that we just proved that Nh(p) balances fairness
and eciency with respect to p.
19slightly, but the weighted utilitarian solution of the scaled problem jumps to
the right of the Ep|a contradiction. Finally, the latter argument also applies
to the weighted Nash solution, and therefore Nh(p)(T) = (T). By scale-
invariance Nh(p)(S) = (S).
Proof of Lemma 1: Let p 2 (0;1) and  =
p
1 p. It is easy to see that it suces
to prove the lemma for problems in B
2. Let then S be such a problem and
let f be the smooth function, dened on [0;A], which describes its boundary.
Since both Up and Ep are homogeneous|namely, (cS) = c(S) for every
S, c > 0, and  2 fUp;Epg|it suces to consider rescalings of one player's
utility. Wlog, I will consider rescalings of player 2's utility by  > 0. With
Ep(T) = (a;f(a)) for some a 2 [0;A], the required equalities are f(a) = a
and f0(a) =  . That is, it is sucient (and necessary) to nd an a 2 [0;A]
such that a
f(a) =  
f0(a), or  (a) 
 af0(a)
f(a) = 2. There exists a unique such a
because, by the assumptions on f, the function   is strictly increasing, and
satises  (0) = 0 and  (a) ! 1 as a ! A.
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